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Introduction
In 2009, retired engineer Paul Chandler and his economist wife,
Rachel, set off in their 38-foot yacht for a sailing trip around the world.1
The trip did not go as planned.  On October 23, 2009, while the couple was
en route from the Seychelles to Tanzania, they set off their emergency bea-
con.2  By October 28, it was clear that they had been captured by pirates.3
The pirates threatened to use the Chandlers as insurance to derail a rescue
attempt for another set of hostages.4  The evidence, though, showed that
† Associate Professor, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law.
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Indiana University New Frontiers Exploratory Travel Grant.
†† Project Officer, Oceans Beyond Piracy; Nanda Center Fellow, University of
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1. Brian Flynn, John Coles, & Neil Syson, Brits’ yacht seen on way to port, SUN (Oct.
28, 2009), http://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2009/Oct/12604/brits_yacht_seen_on_way
_to_port.aspx; Xan Rice & Sam Jones, Somali pirates claim to have seized British couple’s
yacht, GUARDIAN  (Oct. 27, 2009), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/oct/27/
somali-pirates-british-yacht; Caroline Davies, Sam Jones, & Xan Rice, Tunbridge Wells
couple on dream voyage seized by pirates, GUARDIAN (Oct. 27, 2009), http://www.guardian
.co.uk/world/2009/oct/27/pirates-seize-turnbridge-wells-couple.
2. Rice & Jones, supra note 1. R
3. Flynn, Coles & Syson, supra note 1. R
4. Caroline Davies, British couple seized as insurance, say pirates, GUARDIAN (Oct. 28,
2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/oct/28/britons-seized-by-somali-pirates
[hereinafter British Couple Seized].
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what the pirates really wanted was a ransom payment.5
The pirates’ initial demand of £4.2 million was not even a day old
before Her Majesty’s Government stated its unequivocal position: “The gov-
ernment will not make any substantive concessions to hostage-takers,
including the payment of ransoms.”6  The UK government’s position was
particularly problematic for the Chandlers because the latter had no insur-
ance, and had used the vast majority of their funds to finance their trip.7
The next thirteen months were marked by the Chandlers’ repeated pleas for
assistance and reports of their physical and emotional abuse.8  The follow-
ing statement from Paul Chandler on a tape released in January 2010 is
representative of the couple’s calls for help, especially as their situation
became increasingly dire:
I just want to say please to my government get me and my wife out of here.
We are innocent, we have done no wrong.  We have no money and we can’t
pay a ransom.  We just need the government to help, anyone who can help
us out of here.  Day after day and this is 98 days of solitary confinement, no
exercise.  I don’t know what to do.  Will somebody please help?  The govern-
ment or somebody else?9
Although the UK government never wavered in its “no concessions”
policy,10 the Chandlers’ relatives managed to assemble enough money to
satisfy the pirates who were holding them hostage.11  In November 2010,
after the pirates received a ransom of around £62,000, the couple was sent
home.12  In the words of Paul Chandler, they were “rather skinny and bony
but . . . fine.”13
The Chandlers are just two amongst thousands of innocent victims
5. Flynn, Coles & Syson, supra note 1. R
6. Sam Jones, Somali pirates demand $7m to release British hostages, GUARDIAN (Oct.
30, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/oct/30/somalian-pirates-yacht-
couple-hostages.
7. Xan Rice, The Chandlers’ release: How the deal was done, GUARDIAN (Nov. 14,
2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/14/paul-chandler-rachel-chandler-
release-deal; British couple seized, supra note 4. R
8. The Chandlers’ release: How the deal was done, supra note 7; British couple held by R
pirates filmed appealing for government help, GUARDIAN (Jan. 31, 2010), http://www.the
guardian.com/world/2010/jan/31/paul-rachel-chandler-pirate-captive [hereinafter Brit-
ish couple appealing for government help].
9. British couple appealing for government help, supra note 8. R
10. David Batty, Kidnapped Britons believe Somali pirates will kill them, GUARDIAN
(Jan. 21, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jan/21/britons-held-by-soma
li-pirates; British couple appealing for government help, supra note 8; Virginia Wheeler, R
Hostage Brits’ plea to the PM, SUN (May 27, 2010), http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/home
page/news/2989458/Hostage-Brits-plea-to-David-Cameron.html; Haroon Siddique, Paul
and Rachel Chandler appeal to David Cameron to secure their release, GUARDIAN (May 26,
2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/26/paul-rachel-chandler-hostage-
piracy.
11. See The Chandlers’ release: How the deal was done, supra note 7. R
12. Neil Syson & Alex West, Brit pair’s hostage hell over, SUN (Jan. 12, 2011), http://
www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/3227722/Brit-pairs-hostage-hell-over.html
13. Somali pirates free UK couple Paul and Rachel Chandler, BBC (Nov. 14, 2010),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11752027.
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who have suffered at the hands of Somali pirates since the mid-2000s.14  A
recent study by the World Bank reports that “[a]s many as 3,741
crewmembers of 125 different nationalities have fallen prey to [Somali]
pirates, with detention periods of as long as 1,178 days.”15  Between 2010
and 2012 alone, Somali pirates hijacked over ninety vessels and received
$367.37 million in ransom payments.16  As of December 2012, Somali
pirates were holding more than 100 crewmembers of different nationalities
captive.17
Despite the international community’s anti-piracy measures, the
Chandlers and many others have fallen victim to Somali pirates.  Since
2008, navies have been patrolling the pirate-infested waters off the Somali
coast, and since mid-2011, a large percentage of ships have been employ-
ing private armed guards to protect them against pirate attacks.18  These
and other measures have had some success at keeping seafarers safe.19
Those who have participated in the naval counter-piracy patrols, however,
warn against complacency.20  As one U.S. admiral has explained, pirates
are in the business of making money, and they have found, and will con-
tinue to find, ways to overcome the defensive measures that are imple-
mented to prevent successful hijackings.21
Indeed, there is no reason to believe that pirates will simply abandon
the illegal activities that have enabled them to reap huge monetary
rewards.22  Somali pirates will continue to hijack ships in exchange for ran-
som payments because the payments have only been growing in recent
years.23  The average ransom has “increased sevenfold in the last five years”
from about $600,000 in 2007 to about $5 million in 2011.24  Although
exact numbers are not known, estimates suggest that individual pirate
crewmembers or guards can earn between $10,000 and $15,000 for partic-
14. THE WORLD BANK REGIONAL VICE-PRESIDENCY FOR AFRICA, THE PIRATES OF SOMALIA:
ENDING THE THREAT, REBUILDING A NATION, at xxi-xxii (2013), available at http://siter-
esources.worldbank.org/INTAFRICA/Resources/pirates-of-somalia-main-report-web.pdf
[hereinafter 2013 WORLD BANK REPORT].
15. Id. at xxii.
16. JONATHAN BELLISH ET. AL., THE ECONOMIC COST OF SOMALI PIRACY 2012, at 11
(2012), available at http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/attachments/
View%20Full%20Report_1.pdf [hereinafter ECOP 2012].
17. INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE INT’L MARITIME BUREAU, PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY
AGAINST SHIPS 20 (2013), available at http://www.crimson.eu.com/assets/2012_Annual_
IMB_Piracy_Report.pdf [hereinafter ICC– IMB 2012 REPORT].
18. See infra notes 42– 43, 46 and accompanying text. R
19. See e.g., ICC– IMB 2012 REPORT, supra note 17, at 5– 6. R
20. Admiral warns against withdrawing naval support on piracy, MARITIME SECURITY
INT’L (Oct. 24, 2012), http://www.maritimesecurityinternational.net/readnews.php?ide
=87.
21. Id.
22. 2013 WORLD BANK REPORT, supra note 14, at 89 (detailing how most Somali R
hijackings are organized by an instigator who gathers or provides funding for the attack
and identifies a pirate commander to organize the attack; those who finance the attack
are thereafter entitled to a portion of any ransom collected).
23. FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, PIRACY OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA, 2010– 2012, H.C.
1318, at 55 (U.K.).
24. Id.
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ipating in a successful attack,25 and perhaps more than $50,000 in a
year.26  These sums are huge in Somalia, a country where the youth unem-
ployment rate is around 67%,27 and the median income is approximately
$600 per year.28
Concerns that ransom payments play a large role in encouraging and
sustaining maritime piracy have prompted some, including British Prime
Minister David Cameron, to suggest that banning ransom payments in
their entirety may be necessary to end the threat.29  If pirates attack ships
in the hope of obtaining a lucrative ransom payoff, then taking away the
possibility of a ransom payment should eliminate the incentive to engage
in piracy, as well as strip pirates of the opportunity to obtain the funds
necessary to finance future illegal activities.  This deterrence argument is
what governments with “no concessions” policies point to when they
refuse to negotiate with hostage-takers.30  Some governments, like those of
the United States and the United Kingdom, cite this deterrence argument to
discourage their private citizens and companies from acceding to ransom
demands.31
However, as the Chandlers’ story illustrates, refusing to negotiate with
hostage-takers also puts innocent lives at risk.32  This is the contrasting
point that ship owners and their industry representatives make in response
to any suggestions that governments should ban ransom payments.33  Ship
owners have thus far made sure that they can accede to pirates’ ransom
demands by purchasing kidnap and ransom insurance.34
This Article is sympathetic to both the arguments in favor of and
against a piracy ransom ban.  At the same time, we suggest that additional
analysis is warranted before anyone concludes that a piracy ransom ban
would offer a promising tool for solving the problem of maritime piracy.
This Article undertakes that additional analysis by examining (1) the legal-
25. 2013 WORLD BANK REPORT, supra note14, at 112. R
26. GEOPOLICITY, THE ECONOMICS OF PIRACY: PIRATE RANSOMS & LIVELIHOODS OFF THE
COAST OF SOMALIA 12 (2011), available at http://www.geopolicity.com/upload/content/
pub_1305229189_regular.pdf.
27. United Nations Development Programme Somalia, Somalia Human Develop-
ment Report 2012: Empowering Youth for Peace and Development, at xix (2012), http://
www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/corporate/HDR/Arab%20States/HDR-Soma
lia-2012-E.pdf.
28. See Christine Mungal, Somalia: Total Cost of Piracy Menace Leapfrogs Tanzania’s
Annual Budget, ALLAFRICA (May 11, 2011), http://allafrica.com/stories/201105111061
.html.
29. Nick Hopkins, Judith Tebbutt case puts spotlight on government’s ransom policy,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 21, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2012/mar/21/judith-teb
butt-spotlight-ransom-policy (detailing that British Prime Minister David Cameron has
called for the creation of a task force on ransoms whose goal should be to end the
practice of making ransom payments). See also discussion infra at notes 111– 112. R
30. See infra notes 87– 95 and accompanying text. R
31. See infra note 109 and accompanying text. R
32. See supra notes 1– 13 and accompanying text. R
33. See Richard Neylon, Calls to ban ransom payments are misguided, LLOYD’S LIST
(Oct. 31, 2011), http://www.lloydslist.com/ll/sector/ship-operations/article383161.ece.
34. See infra.notes 73– 76 and accompanying text. R
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ity of a ban from a criminal law standpoint on retributive theories about
punishment and (2) the practicality of a ban given the international con-
text in which the potential ban would have to apply.
We agree on the need to find a solution to the problem of maritime
piracy and the piracy ransoms that help fuel the illegal activities that put
lives at risk.  We conclude, however, that a piracy ransom ban would likely
be inconsistent with the retributive principles of criminal law, since it
would punish innocent victims who pay ransoms under duress.  We fur-
ther suggest that even if there are good reasons, in theory, to criminalize
ransom payments, banning piracy ransoms would be impractical from an
international law standpoint since any such ban would pose collective
action problems.  In short, absent the unlikely universal ban, a piracy ran-
som ban, supported only by select countries, is unlikely to prove an effec-
tive deterrent to maritime piracy.
We proceed by briefly describing the modern maritime piracy prob-
lem and the piracy-for-ransom business model.  After discussing the ethical
dilemma posed generally by ransom bans, and some of the arguments for
and against a piracy ransom ban, we then turn to analyzing the legality and
practicality of a potential piracy ransom ban as a solution to the modern
maritime piracy problem.
I. The Modern Maritime Piracy Problem
A. The Rise and Continued Threat of Somali Piracy
Around the end of the nineteenth century, most thought that the age
of maritime piracy had ended.35  Unfortunately, that prediction proved
premature. Around 2005, Somali pirates began launching attacks on ves-
sels travelling off the Somali coast, hijacking ships and only releasing the
ship and cargo upon the receipt of hefty ransom payments.36
Somali piracy reached its peak in 2010, with attacks spreading well off
the coastline into the Indian Ocean and to the west coast of the Indian
subcontinent.37  That year, Somali Pirates were responsible for 139
reported attempted hijackings, 49 of which were successful.38  The pirates
reaped huge rewards for their illegal activities, receiving a total of $238
35. PHILIP GOSSE, THE HISTORY OF PIRACY 297– 98 (1932) (“It is likely that the disap-
pearance [of pirates] is permanent.”).
36. INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE INT’L MARITIME BUREAU, PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY
AGAINST SHIPS ANNUAL REPORT 16 (2006), available at http://www.le-havre.vessels-in-
france.net/fichiersdoc/2005_ICC_Piracy_annual_report.pdf [hereinafter ICC-IMB 2005
REPORT].
37. See ANNA BOWDEN ET AL., THE ECONOMIC COST OF SOMALI PIRACY 2011, at 8
(2012), available at http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/economic_cost_of
_piracy_2011.pdf [hereinafter ECOP 2011].
38. INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE INT’L MARITIME BUREAU, PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY
AGAINST SHIPS ANNUAL REPORT 8 (2011), available at http://www.steamshipmutual.com/
Downloads/Piracy/IMBPiracyReport2010.pdf [hereinafter ICC-IMB 2010 REPORT].
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million in exchange for releasing the crews and cargo of 44 ships.39  By
2010, maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia was truly a global menace,
imposing a cost upwards of $7 billion per year on those directly involved in
combating piracy,40 and adding an estimated $18 billion in total cost to
the global economy.41
In fact, Somali pirate attacks reached that 2010 peak despite the inter-
national community’s and individual ship owners’ anti-piracy efforts.42
For example, since 2008 (and continuing through 2013), the world’s navies
have been escorting ships travelling off the Horn of Africa, patrolling the
Indian Ocean to ward off attacks, and responding to reported attacks— at a
cost of around $2 billion per year.43 The shipping industry has also
expended great efforts and sums in order to suppress piracy.44  At a cost of
billions of dollars per year, ships have steamed at faster-than-optimal
speeds through the Indian Ocean, re-routed to avoid vulnerability, and
installed ship-hardening measures such as razor wire and safe rooms.45
When pirate attacks only continued to rise, however, by mid-2011, states
began allowing their ship owners to hire private armed guards to protect
them.46  Although anecdotal evidence suggests that the use of private
guards has been very effective at preventing successful pirate attacks,47 the
use of private guards remains controversial due to legal ambiguities and a
perceived lack of regulatory oversight.48  The private maritime security
industry barely existed before the rise of Somalia based piracy.49  Yet by
2012, more than 140 private security firms were operating in the Indian
Ocean,50 costing ship owners and operators between $1.15 and $1.53
billion.51
Some evidence indicates that these various tactics are working: the
number of Somali pirate attacks has been declining since the end of
2011.52  However, as cautioned by many of those involved in the fight
39. ANNA BOWDEN ET AL., THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF MARITIME PIRACY 10 (2010), availa-
ble at https://www.cimicweb.org/cmo/Piracy/Documents/Economics%20of%20Piracy/
Cost%20of%20Piracy%20Final%20Report.pdf [hereinafter ECOP 2010].
40. Id. at 25.
41. 2013 WORLD BANK REPORT supra note 14, at 25. http://siteresources.worldbank R
.org/INTAFRICA/Resources/pirates-of-somalia-main-report-web.pdf.
42. ECOP 2010, supra note 39, at 14– 16 (describing anti-piracy measures taken by R
naval forces and ship owners).
43. Id. at 15– 16.  As of 2011, 20 states have contributed to the effort to combat
piracy by prosecuting and imprisoning the pirates captured by their naval forces. ECOP
2011 supra note 37, 23. R
44. ECOP 2012 supra note 16, at 18– 25. R
45. Id.
46. ECOP 2011, supra note 37, at 8. R
47. James Brown, Pirates and Privateers: Managing the Indian Ocean’s Private Security
Boom, LOWY INSTITUTE FOR INT’L POL’Y, 3 (Sept. 2012), http://www.lowyinstitute.org/
files/brown_pirates_and_privateers_web.pdf.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 5.
50. Id.
51. ECOP 2012 supra note 16, at 18. R
52. ICC-IMB 2012 REPORT, supra note 17, at 5– 6. See also Samihah Zaman & Nada R
AlTaher, Successful piracy attempts decline in Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea, GULF NEWS
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against piracy, it is not yet time for celebration, as piracy remains a signifi-
cant global threat.53  One U.S. admiral who has commanded a task force
off the coast of Somalia notes that Somali pirates have demonstrated their
ability to adapt to the various defensive measures employed by ships:
pirates have begun operating further out to sea to avoid naval patrols and
have begun boarding ships at night to avoid ships’ passive security mea-
sures.54  In fact, according to Donna Hopkins, Chair of the United Nations
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, pirates “still roam a
huge part of the Indian Ocean as well as the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden
looking for vessels to hijack.”55
In short, while international efforts to combat Somali piracy have con-
tributed to a decline in successful attacks, the efforts have not been able to
stop piracy from appearing to be an attractive employment option.56
Somali pirates have found, and will continue to find, ways to overcome
anti-piracy measures.57  Somali pirates will not likely be easily deterred
from seeking out the huge profits that are the signature feature of the
Somali piracy-for-ransom business model discussed below.58
B. The Somali Piracy-For-Ransom Business Model
Somali pirates stage their attacks using a somewhat predictable pat-
tern.  Teams of pirates approach a merchant vessel on any number of high
speed skiffs, wielding automatic rifles and often rocket-propelled gre-
nades.59  They typically launch from mother ships more than a thousand
miles off the Somali coast.60  From their skiffs, the pirates board the
merchant vessel, commandeer the ship under the threat of violence, and
(June 4, 2013), http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/uae/crime/successful-piracy-attempts-
decline-in-gulf-of-aden-and-arabian-sea-1.1192614.
53. ICC-IMB 2012 REPORT, supra note 17, at 20 (warning against complacency); R
Chris Mgidu, EU naval force warns of piracy threats despite reduction off Horn of Africa,
XINHUANET (Nov. 8, 2012), http://hiiraan.com/news4/2012/Nov/26761/eu_navalforce_
warns_of_piracy_threats_despite_reduction_off_horn_of_africa.aspx (quoting an EU
representative as arguing against complacency); What happened to Somalia’s pirates?,
ECONOMIST (May 19, 2013), http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/
2013/05/economist-explains-11 “gains [against piracy] are fragile and reversible”).
54. Admiral warns against withdrawing naval support on piracy, MARITIME SECURITY
INT’L (Oct. 24, 2012), http://www.maritimesecurityinternational.net/readnews.php?ide
=87.
55. No Hijacking by Somali Pirates in Nearly a Year, MARITIMESECURITY.ASIA (May 5,
2013), http://maritimesecurity.asia/free-2/piracy-2/no-hijacking-by-somali-pirates-in-
nearly-a-year-2/.
56. See ICC-IMB 2012 REPORT, supra note 17, at 5– 6. R
57. Admiral warns against withdrawing naval support on piracy, supra note 54. R
58. See infra Part I.B.
59. See e.g., Rob Walker, Inside story of Somali pirate attack, BBC (June 4, 2009),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8080098.stm; see also ICC-IMB 2012 REPORT, supra
note 17, at 22; Mgidu, supra note 53. R
60. See, e.g., ICC-IMB 2012 REPORT, supra note 17, at 22; see also Richard Sisk, U.S. R
Navy captures 5 Somali pirates, siezes [sic] pirate mother ship off Kenya, Somali coasts, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS (Apr. 1, 2010), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/u-s-navy-cap
tures-5-somali-pirates-siezes-pirate-mother-ship-kenya-somali-coasts-article-1.168171#ix
zz2XRQCGgAp.
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force the captain to steam towards the Somali coast.61
Staging an attack requires not only personnel, but also money.  In
Somalia, pirate attacks are typically financed in one of several ways.  In
some cases, a single entrepreneur provides the backing for a team or teams
of pirates who seek out ships to hijack.62  Other pirate teams are organized
so that individual pirates take an ownership stake in the venture and share
in the proceeds.63  Finally and most commonly, organized criminal syndi-
cates provide an opportunity for investors to fund multiple teams of
pirates.64  Funding a team of pirates can require upwards of $250,000 in
startup costs.65  Both the investors and the on-the-water pirates get paid if
and when the pirates are able to negotiate a ransom payment.66
Somali pirates use the piracy-for-ransom business model for several
reasons.  First, of course, the piracy-for-ransom business model is a lucra-
tive one that enables pirates to reap multi-million dollar rewards.67  Sec-
ond, Somali pirates do not have a real market in which to sell a hijacked
ships’ cargo.68  Third, Somali pirates have been successful at negotiating
with local communities for safe harbors to anchor hijacked ships: pirates
pay off government officials and members of local communities so that
pirates can hold their hostages for long periods of time while they negoti-
ate a ransom payment.69  Due to the protection afforded by safe harbors,
the ransom negotiation phase can last for years, all to the detriment of
hostage seafarers who either lose their lives or suffer severe physical and
psychological trauma.70
The pirates usually employ a bilingual person to conduct negotia-
tions,71 while ship owners usually entrust negotiations to professional
negotiators.72  Unlike the Chandlers, most large scale commercial ship
owners and operators whose ships steam through pirate-infested waters
purchase kidnap and ransom insurance policies to aid them in the event of
a hijacking.73  These policies provide for the assistance of professional cri-
61. Walker, supra note 59. R
62. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, ORGANISED MARITIME PIRACY AND RELATED KIDNAP-
PING FOR RANSOM 17 (2011) [hereinafter FATF REPORT].
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Chana Joffe-Walt, Behind the Business Plan of Pirates Inc., NPR (Apr. 30, 2009),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=103657301.
66. Id.
67. FATF REPORT, supra note 62, at 8. R
68. 2013 WORLD BANK REPORT, supra note 14, at xxiv, 109. R
69. Id. at xxiv, 109– 110.
70. See, e.g., Catherine E. Shoichet & Neda Farshbaf, Ship crew held for 1,000 days
rescued off coast of Yemen, CNN (Dec. 24, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/24/
world/africa/somalia-pirate-rescue (describing that crewmembers of the Panamanian
MV Iceberg 1 were held hostage by pirates for nearly three years); ECOP 2012, supra
note 16, at 11– 12. R
71. 2013 WORLD BANK REPORT, supra note 14, at 93. R
72. Brown, supra note 47, at 6. R
73. ECOP 2012, supra note 16, at 31. R
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sis management, negotiation, and public relations teams.74 These policies
also specifically cover ransom payments and can provide either worldwide
or geographically-specific coverage for a term of years.75  This certainty of
reimbursement and access to services comes at a cost of up to $12,500 for
a single transit through the high-risk area.76
When negotiations are complete, the ransom is delivered and distrib-
uted.77  According to the World Bank, the proceeds for an average ransom
are split between the pirate crewmembers (who earn around $10,500
each), guards and suppliers for the ship once it is anchored off the Somali
coast (who earn $2-3 per day), and those who contributed start-up capital
and working capital to the operation (who earn back the $300,000 to
$400,000 that was contributed to the operation).78  Investors also receive a
percentage of the ransom proceeds.79  In addition, as much as 20% of the
ransom proceeds are put aside to fund future attacks.80
One might think that even without a piracy ransom ban, pirates and
those who invest in piracy could be stopped after-the-fact: by tracking the
ransom payments and thereafter arresting and prosecuting recipients of
the payments.  Unfortunately, the evidence thus far seems to indicate oth-
erwise.81  By way of example, consider the hijacking of the Danish-owned
MV Danica White. After the ship was hijacked, the United States recorded
the serial numbers of the bills composing the US$1.2 million that was paid
as ransom to the pirates, and also shared the information with Danish
authorities.82  Nevertheless, neither the U.S. nor Danish authorities was
ever able to trace any of the bills, likely because of the ease with which
money is laundered in Somalia.83
II. The Ethical Dilemma of Banning Ransom Payments
The above discussion shows that states and ship owners have
employed a variety of tactics in an effort to stop pirates from attacking and
74. Jay MacDonald, Firms snatch up kidnap and ransom insurance, BANKRATE
(Oct. 30, 2012), http://www.bankrate.com/finance/insurance/kidnap-ransom-insur-
ance.aspx.  These policies may also cover: reimbursement of any ransom payments lost
in transit; legal defense if a kidnapped employee sues; any travel expenses related to
ransom payment; medical and psychiatric rehabilitation of victims; payment of salaries
to kidnapped persons’ families for the duration of the kidnapping; and repatriation,
burial, and cremation services for victims. See id.  See also Kidnap and Ransom, AON RISK
SOLUTIONS, http://www.aon.com/attachments/risk-services/2012-Kidnap-and-Ransom
.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2014) [hereinafter AON RISK SOLUTIONS].
75. See, e.g., AON RISK SOLUTIONS supra note 74. R
76. ECOP 2012 supra note 16, at 33. R
77. Walker, supra note 59. R
78. 2013 WORLD BANK REPORT, supra note 1415, at 110– 15. R
79. Id. at 114.
80. See, e.g., Nikolas K. Gvosdev, Privateering the Pirates, NAT’L INT. (Apr. 10, 2009),
http://nationalinterest.org/article/privateering-the-pirates-3082.
81. ECOP 2012, supra note 16, at 28. (detailing that though there were 1,190 pirates R
captured worldwide in 2012, there were only 21 completed piracy trials).
82. FATF REPORT, supra note 62, at 11. R
83. Id. at 11, 15.
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hijacking ships.  Yet even if those anti-piracy tactics are effective in reduc-
ing piracy in the short-term, some commentators argue that the best way to
deter would-be pirates from choosing piracy as a career option— thereby
better protecting seafarers from a continued threat of hijackings and hos-
tage-takings—  is to eliminate ransom payments.84  In other words, if one
eliminates ransom payments, one takes away the pirates’ opportunities to
profit from their illegal activities, and also takes away the funds necessary
for pirates to stage additional successful attacks.  The U.N. Monitoring
Group on Somalia tasked with investigating arms embargo violations in
Somalia supports this approach.85  The Monitoring Group reported:
[T]here is no escaping the importance of escalating ransom payments in
fuelling the growth of piracy (and the related crime of kidnapping) and in
financing violations of the arms embargo.  Piracy attacks have become the
most lucrative economic activity in Somalia, and the pirates are using part of
the ransom monies to upgrade their arsenals in order to become more effec-
tive and efficient in their operations.  Unless international action is able to
reverse the cost-benefit ratio that drives the piracy phenomenon, it is likely
to remain a scourge to international shipping in the Gulf of Aden and Indian
Ocean and to peace and security in Somalia.86
But is a piracy ransom ban a legal and practical solution to the prob-
lem of maritime piracy?  To set the stage for our analysis of this precise
question in the sections that follow, we first address the underlying ethical
dilemma that necessarily informs any decision about whether to ban ran-
som payments: whether to sacrifice innocent lives in the short term to real-
ize the potential long-term goal of deterring future criminal activity.  We
begin with a discussion of countries’ general ransom policies to show how
some states have thus far grappled with and resolved this ethical dilemma.
84. See, e.g., Paul Lansing & Michael Petersen, Ship-Owners and the Twenty-First Cen-
tury Somali Pirate: The Business Ethics of Ransom Payment, 102 J. BUS. ETHICS 507, 513
(2011) (proposing that the shipping industry mandate a no-ransom policy for all firms
as part of a several-pronged plan for solving the piracy problem); Abdon M. Pallasch,
Kirk: U.S. should say no to pirate ransoms, CHI. SUN TIMES (May 6, 2011), http://www
.suntimes.com/news/5220031-418/kirk-u.s.-should-say-no-to-pirate-ransoms (propos-
ing that the U.S. should push for a total ban on piracy ransoms, even though it may pose
a threat to hostages, because it is the “best long-term strategy to cripple the industry”).
See also Meadow Clendenin, Comment, “No Concessions” with No Teeth: How Kidnap and
Ransom Insurers and Insureds are Undermining U.S. Counterterrorism Policy, 56 EMORY
L.J. 741, 772– 73 (2006) (arguing that the insurance industry generally should adopt a
policy of not insuring against, or reimbursing for, ransom payments to kidnappers and
terrorists); Hopkins, supra note 29 (reporting on Prime Minister David Cameron’s R
speech at the London Conference on Somalia calling for a task force on ransoms with
the ultimate objective of ending ransom payments to pirates). But see Richard Neylon,
Banning Ransom Payments to Somali Pirates would Outlaw the Only Method a Shipowner
has to Remove his Crew from Harm’s Way and Rescue his Vessel and Cargo, LLOYD’S LIST
(Nov. 1, 2011), http://www.hfw.com/downloads/HFW-LL%20Article%20-%20Ban%20
Ransom%20Payments%20%5bA4%204pp%5d%20February%202012.pdf (rejecting
calls to ban ship owners and private individuals from paying piracy ransoms).
85. Rep. of the Monitoring Grp. on Som. pursuant to S.C. resolution 1811 (2008), ¶
266, U.N. Doc. S/2008/769 (Dec. 10, 2008), available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/
view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2008/769.
86. Id.
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We then address this ethical dilemma in the specific context of maritime
piracy by setting out the arguments that have been advanced by various
stakeholders in support of and against banning piracy ransom payments.
A. Countries’ Ransom Policies
Some governments have “no concessions” policies: these countries
will not negotiate with hijackers.87  They have essentially resolved the ethi-
cal dilemma of banning ransom payments in favor of the long-term goal of
reducing the risk of future illegal activity.88  For example, the United States
reports that it will make “no concessions” to anyone who takes its citizens
hostage.89  The government states that while it “will use every appropriate
resource to gain the safe return of American citizens who are held hos-
tage . . . the [official] policy [is] to deny hostage-takers the benefits of ran-
som, prisoner releases, policy changes, or other acts of concession.”90  The
comments of the United States’ Under Secretary for Terrorism and Finan-
cial Intelligence, David S. Cohen, explain the government’s rationale under-
lying the “no concessions” policy.91  He stated:
I think there is no doubt that the payment of ransom just fuels the appetite
for additional kidnapping operations, and that is true whether it’s Somali
pirates, a terrorist organization, a drug gang— it’s true across the board.  So
point number one is we firmly believe that the right approach is to get to a
place where ransoms are not paid and that the people who are contemplat-
ing that tactic recognize that there is no pot of gold at the end of the
rainbow.92
Other countries make similar points in support of their “no conces-
sions” policies.  Britain’s Foreign Secretary made the following comments
after Somali pirates released the Chandlers: “Hostage taking is fundamen-
tally wrong, and the Government will never reward hostage taking.  People
will understand the position of successive British governments that we do
87. FATF REPORT, supra note 62, at 23. R
88. In fact, some scholars have found empirical evidence to support the wisdom of
the “no concessions” policy: namely, that “[p]ast concessions  have the strongest impact
on generating future kidnapping events.”  Patrick T. Brandt & Todd Sandler, Hostage
Taking: Understanding Terrorism Event Dynamics, 31 J. POL. MODELING 758, 758 (2009).
89. Press Statement by Richard Boucher, International Terrorism: American Hostages,
U.S. DEP’T ST. (Feb. 20, 2002), http://2001– 2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/8190
.htm.
90. Id. At a Security Council Debate on Piracy and Somalia in November 2009, U.S.
Ambassador Rosemary DiCarlo urged other states to adopt this same “no concessions”
policy when dealing with pirates so as to cease encouraging pirates to further engage in
illegal activities.  Rosemary A. DiCarlo, U.S. Ambassador & Alt. Representative for Spe-
cial Political Affairs, U.S. Mission to the U.N., Remarks at a Security Council Debate on
Piracy and Somalia, in the Security Council Chamber (Nov. 18, 2009) available at http:/
/usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/2009/132070.htm.
91. Interview by Xenia Dormandy with David S. Cohen, U.S. Under Sec’y for Terror-
ism & Fin. Intelligence, Transcript Q&A: Kidnapping for Ransom: The Growing Terrorism
Financing Challenge, CHATHAM HOUSE, 9 (Oct. 5, 2012), http://www.chathamhouse.org/
sites/default/files/public/Meetings/Meeting%20Transcripts/051012CohenQA.pdf
[hereinafter Cohen Q & A].
92. Id.
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not pay ransoms or make significant concessions otherwise there would be
a risk of many more hostage takings.”93  Australia’s government makes a
comparable point in support of its “no ransom” policy, explaining that pay-
ing ransoms would only encourage the kidnapping-for-ransom business in
general and put more lives at risk.94  Even when confronted with threats by
hostage-takers to harm innocent victims, both Australia and the Philip-
pines noted that they have strict policies of refusing to pay ransoms— pre-
cisely because they believe that paying would encourage additional
kidnappings.95
Not all governments, however, are apparently as willing to stand by an
unequivocal policy against paying ransoms.96  Reports indicate that some
Western European countries have been persuaded to accede to ransom
demands in an effort to save innocent lives in the short-term, notwithstand-
ing a stated policy to the contrary.97  Commentators have charged that in
93. Announcement that Foreign Secretary welcomes release of the Chandlers, GOV.UK
(Nov. 15, 2010), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-welcomes-
the-release-of-the-chandlers. See also UK defends not paying pirates ransom for kidnapped
pair, BBC (Feb. 1, 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/kent/8491301
.stm (quoting a Foreign Office spokesperson who defended the British government’s
policy to not make or facilitate concessions to hostage-takers).  The U.K. Foreign Secre-
tary explained this point even further in his remarks to the U.N. Security Council during
a briefing on terrorism.  William Hague, Member of Parliament, Foreign Secretary Sup-
ports UN Efforts Against Terrorism, Condemns Ransom Payments to Terrorists (Sept.
27, 2010), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/foreign-secretary-sup
ports-un-efforts-against-terrorism-condemns-ransom-payments-to-terrorists.  The For-
eign Secretary urged against understanding ransom payments to hostage-takers “as a
‘necessary evil’ or as a legitimate tool for resolving kidnaps.” Id.  Instead, he argued that
paying millions to hostage-takers will only “encourage more kidnaps and fund murder,”
given that successful hijackings can be mounted at a cost which is only a small fraction
of the potential ransom reward. Id.
94. Daniel Flitton, No-ransom policy to stay, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Sept. 27,
2012), http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/noransom-policy-to-stay-
20120926-26lii.html (quoting an Australian Foreign Affairs Department official as say-
ing that “[c]hanging the relevant legislation would undermine Australia’s no-ransom
policy, and indirectly result in Australians overseas being targeted”).
95. Al Jacinto & Lindsay Murdoch, Australian hostage’s ransom investigated, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD (Apr. 11, 2013), http://www.smh.com.au/national/australian-hos
tages-ransom-investigated-20130410-2hln5.html (reporting that both the Australian and
Philippines governments have strict policies against paying ransoms to hostage-takers so
as not to encourage further kidnappings). See also Arlene Paredes, Philippines Says No
Ransom for Kidnapped Australian Warren Rodwell, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2012), http://
au.ibtimes.com/articles/277295/20120106/philippines-ransom-kidnapped-australian-
warren-rodwell-video.htm.
96. Aid worker kidnappings rise, fuelling debate over ransom, IRIN (Mar. 21, 2013),
http://www.irinnews.org/report/97697/aid-worker-kidnappings-rise-fuelling-debate-
over-ransom (“[C]ountries such as France, Germany and Spain are alleged to have paid
tens of millions of dollars over the past decade to secure the release of nationals taken
hostage by groups linked to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), circumventing the
prohibitions [on paying ransoms] by making the payments through intermediaries.
This put [sic] such countries at odds with the UK and the US, which refuse to pay
ransoms, even indirectly.”).
97. Id. See also The ransom business: Blood Money, ECONOMIST (Nov. 6, 2013), http://
www.economist.com/blogs/baobab/2013/11/ransom-business (detailing ransoms
allegedly paid by the French government, and detailing the French government’s corre-
sponding unwillingness to admit that such ransoms were paid).
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the past decade, Western European governments have paid between $70
and $130 million in cash to al-Qaeda and other militant groups, through
intermediaries, in order to persuade those groups to release hostages from
captivity.98  Persons critical of the payments argue that the monies keep
terrorist organizations well-stocked, and also provide terrorist organiza-
tions with monies to recruit.99  Critics also argue that without strict adher-
ence to a “no concessions” policy, terrorists will continue to rely on taking
ransoms in exchange for releasing European hostages to fund their opera-
tions.100  Whether such arguments will persuade governments remains to
be seen.  However, French President Franc¸ois Hollande has recently made
clear that France will be enforcing a strict policy against negotiating with
hostage-takers, insisting that France will instead rely on military force to
rescue French citizens taken hostage.101
Yet even if governments are willing to sacrifice lives in the short term
in favor of a long-term goal of deterring future criminal activity, only a few
countries currently have, or have had, laws prohibiting their private citi-
zens or corporations from paying ransoms.102  For example, Italy has a law
allowing the government to freeze the assets of the families of kidnapping
victims so that the families are discouraged from acceding to ransom
demands.103  In the early 1990s, Colombia sought to combat its over-
whelming kidnapping epidemic via an anti-abduction law criminalizing the
payment of ransoms, though its Constitutional Court later struck down
portions of the law as unconstitutional.104  In Somalia, even though ran-
98. See, e.g., Alexandria Sage & Sophie Louet, France plays down report of ransom
paid for Niger hostages, REUTERS (Feb. 8, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/
02/08/us-france-hostages-idUSBRE9170UQ20130208 (quoting the former U.S. Ambas-
sador to Mali as saying that though European governments deny it, they have “ paid
about $89 million between 2004-2011 to secure hostages’ freedom”); Lara Vergnaud,
France won’t negotiate with kidnappers, despite political risks, BLOUIN NEWS (Feb. 28,
2013), http://blogs.blouinnews.com/blouinbeatworld/2013/02/28/france-wont-negoti
ate-with-kidnappers-despite-political-risks/ (“In the past decade alone, Britain, Germany,
Italy, Spain, France, Austria, Sweden and the Netherlands have paid over $130 million in
ransom, mainly through intermediaries, to terrorists holding European hostages.”);
Vivienne Walt, Terrorist Hostage Situations: Rescue or Ransom?, TIME (Oct. 12, 2010),
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2024420,00.html (reporting that Alge-
rian officials claim that between 2003 and 2010, Western European governments have
paid the bulk of the more than $70 million that has been paid to al-Qaeda-linked groups
for the release of hostages).
99. See, e.g., Walt, supra note 98; see also Former US Ambassador Says France Indi- R
rectly Paid Islamist Militants, VOA (Feb. 8, 2013), http://www.voanews.com/content/for
mer-us-ambassador-says-france-indirectly-paid-islamist-militants/1599726.html.
100. Vergnaud, supra note 98. R
101. Anne Giudicelli, France: A New Hard Line on Kidnappings?, COMBATING TERRORISM
CENTER (Apr. 29, 2013), http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/france-a-new-hard-line-on-kid
nappings.
102. Lansing & Petersen, supra note 84, at 507. R
103. Celestine Bohlen, Italian Ban on Paying Kidnappers Stirs Anger, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
1, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/02/01/world/italian-ban-on-paying-kidnap-
pers-stirs-anger.html.
104. Laurie Goering, In Colombia, Kidnapping is Big Business, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 8,
1996), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1996-12-08/news/9612080298_1_anti-kid
napping-kidnapping-is-big-business-editor-of-el-tiempo Hargrove v. Underwriters at
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som payments are prevalent, the government has stated that its laws make
paying ransoms illegal.105  In 2011, Somalia charged three Britons and one
American with violating the no-ransom law after the Britons and the Ameri-
can had brought millions of dollars in ransom payments into Somalia.106
Somalia later pardoned the men, who had been facing jail sentences, but
the millions of dollars were confiscated and permanently retained by the
Somali government.107
Although many governments may seek to discourage their private citi-
zens and organizations from paying ransoms, they do not at present
criminalize the conduct.108  For example, neither the United States nor the
United Kingdom bans its private citizens from paying ransoms, though
both counsel against the practice so as not to encourage future kidnap-
pings.109  In other words, states have thus far tended not to force private
citizens whose loved ones are held hostage to pay the price for any long-
term progress that might be gained against the hostage-takers.
B. Banning Piracy Ransoms: Arguments For and Against
As noted above, these same concerns that ransom payments fuel fur-
ther criminal activities and put lives at stake have caused some commenta-
tors to call for banning both states and citizens from paying piracy
ransoms.110  These very concerns prompted Prime Minster David Cam-
eron in early 2012 to call for the creation of a task force to study options
for ending ransom payments to pirates.111  Secretary of State Hillary Clin-
ton supported Cameron’s “initiative to create an international task force to
discourage the payment of ransoms to pirates and other groups to elimi-
nate the profit motive and prevent the illicit flow of money and its corrosive
Lloyd’s, London, 937 F. Supp. 595, 600 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (discussing a Colombian law
prohibiting individuals from paying ransoms to kidnappers, and discussing the Colom-
bian Constitutional Court’s decision to strike down portions of the law as
unconstitutional).
105. Mohamed Ahmed, Somalia jails Britons, American over pirate ransom, REUTERS
(June 19, 2011), http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/06/19/idINIndia-577809201106
19.
106. Id.
107. Somalia: Three Britons pardoned by president, BBC (June 26, 2011), http://www
.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13918991.
108. Lansing & Petersen, supra note 84, at 507 (“While most federal governments R
have non-ransom policies when dealing with piracy, few international, U.S., or other
national laws prohibit private citizens or corporations from paying ransom demands.”).
109. Press Statement by Richard Boucher, supra note 89 (discussing the U.S. policy of R
discouraging U.S. citizens from acceding to ransom demands); see Kidnap ransom refusal
under fire, EXPRESS (Feb. 1, 2010), http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/155582/Kidnap-
ransom-refusal-under-fire (reporting that a nonprofit organization in position to make a
ransom payment to the pirates holding the Chandlers was unable to proceed with the
payment after the U.K. government refused to give its cooperation).
110. See supra notes 84– 86 and accompanying text. R
111. Colin Freeman, Why David Cameron will not stop Somali pirates getting their
pieces of eight, TELEGRAPH (Sept. 6, 2012), http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/colinfree
man/100179584/why-david-cameron-will-not-stop-somali-pirates-getting-their-pieces-of-
eight/.  Prime Minister Cameron initiated the task force because he believed that the
ransom payments “only ensure that crime pays.” Id.
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effects.”112  Twelve additional states joined in the call, and in 2012, they
created an International Piracy Ransoms Task Force to forward policy pro-
posals recommending “how to avoid, reduce or prevent the payment of ran-
soms,” with the ultimate objective of insuring that pirates do not profit
from ransom payments and as a result “abandon the practice of kidnap-
ping for ransom.”113
The support for a task force to study the potential prevention of piracy
ransoms was not universal, however.114  Indeed, maritime organizations
representing ship owners advanced a number of arguments opposing a
potential ban— arguments that resolve the ethical dilemma in favor of sav-
ing innocent lives in the short term.115  For example, INTERTANKO, an
organization representing independent tank owners and operators of oil
and chemical tankers,116 stated: “We must be certain that we can do
whatever is necessary to secure [crews’] release in the event they are taken
hostage.  Payment of ransoms is the only guaranteed way to secure our sea-
farers’ lives.”117  INTERTANKO has also taken issue with the claim that
banning ransoms “will persuade pirates to stop attacking vessels,” instead
arguing that pirates will only become more violent in order to obtain the
“prize a ransom payment promises.”118  INTERTANKO has also empha-
sized the potential environmental damage that could occur should pirates
capture a ship carrying a good like crude oil, only to thereafter abandon
the ship when no ransom payment is forthcoming.119
Maritime industry representatives do not necessarily disagree that
ransom payments fuel the continued existence of maritime piracy.  They
nevertheless argue that despite naval patrols, armed guards, and the use of
112. Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, Secretary Clinton’s Remarks at
London Conference on Somalia (Feb. 23, 2012), available at http://iipdigital.usembassy
.gov/st/english/texttrans/2012/02/20120223143901su0.5437062.html#axzz2UfWCtv
dg.
113. INTERNATIONAL PIRACY RANSOMS TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, at 3 (2012) (on file
with author).
114. See e.g., Letter from Yudhishthir Khatau, Chairman, BIMCO et al., to David Cam-
eron, Prime Minister, U.K. (Mar. 14, 2012), available at http://www.intertanko.com/
Global/Prime%20Minister%20David%20Cameron%20140312.pdf.
115. Id.; see also Michele White, Gen. Counsel, INTERTANKO, Shipping Industry Sub-
mission to International Task Force on Ransom Payments (May 30, 2012), available at
http://www.intertanko.com/News-Desk/Home-Page-Article/UK-led-piracy-Ransom-
Task-Force-debates-ransom-ban-/ (follow “found here” hyperlink to view “full text of
Michele’s intervention”); see also Letter from Alastair Evitt, Chairman, SOS SaveOur-
Seafarers, to David Cameron, Prime Minister, U.K. (Mar. 14, 2012), available at http://
www.intertanko.com/News-Desk/Home-Page-Article/UK-led-piracy-Ransom-Task-Force-
debates-ransom-ban-/ (follow “SOS letters” hyperlink).
116. About Us, INTERTANKO (Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.intertanko.com/About-Us/.
117. White, supra note 115; Letter from Alastair Evitt, supra note 115; (“The conse- R
quences of not paying are too terrible to contemplate as Somali pirates vent their frustra-
tion on innocent seafarers.”); Letter from Yudhishthir Khatau, supra note 114. (“To R
hinder or prevent . . . ransom payments would seriously and unnecessarily expose sea-
farers and deprive ship-owners of their last means of protecting the safety of their
employees at sea).
118. White, supra note 115. R
119. Id.
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more passive defensive measures, pirates still manage to hijack ships.120
Moreover, they argue that absent military intervention— which they charge
is frequently not employed— ship owners have no choice but to pay in order
to prevent their crewmembers from being killed.121  In support of this
claim, INTERTANKO has referenced the hijacking of the Iceberg 1.122  Dur-
ing the 800 days that no ransom was paid and the crew was held hostage,
one crewmember committed suicide and another six (citizens of Yemen,
India, the Philippines, Ghana, Sudan, and Pakistan) were close to death.123
On this same point regarding a lack of other viable options to secure
the safety of crewmembers, the English High Court apparently agrees.124
In Masefield v. Amlin Corp. Member Ltd.,125 the court concluded that
piracy ransom payments did not violate currently binding English law or
public policy.126  Furthermore, the court explained that in its view, diplo-
macy would not likely provide a means of releasing captured ships, given
the absence of any national administration in Somalia.127  In addition, it
noted that “[m]ilitary intervention involves legal and technical difficulties,
and raises a risk to captured crews.”128  Instead, the court suggested that
“the only realistic and effective manner of obtaining the release of a vessel
is the negotiation and payment of a ransom.”129
In December 2012, the Task Force issued its Final Report, making four
recommendations— all addressing ways to better protect against hijackings
and to better respond to them should they occur.130  For reasons unknown,
the Task Force did not tackle in its Final Report the legality or practicality
of a potential piracy ransom ban.131
This Article addresses these questions left open by the Task Force
Final Report.  It does so even though we do not disagree with the Task
120. Letter from Yudhishthir Khatau, supra note 114 (“It is well understood that the R
payment of ransoms only fuels the problem, however as long as ships are hijacked and
seafarers are held for ransom, there is no alternative.”).
121. White, supra note 115 (stating that ship owners pay ransom because there R
appears to be little appetite for military intervention, and that failing payment,
crewmembers will suffer harm).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See Masefield v. Amlin Corp. Member Ltd., [2011] EWCA (Civ) 24, [2009] Q.B.
260 (Eng.).
125. Id.
126. Id. at [63, 74].
127. Id. at [6, 78].
128. Id. at [6].
129. Id. at [6].
130. See INTERNATIONAL PIRACY RANSOMS TASK FORCE, supra note 113, at 2 (recom- R
mending (1) a strategic partnership between various stakeholders to break the piracy
business model; (2) developing a more coordinated approach to sharing information
and evidence to ensure that pirates are prosecuted; (3) strengthening coordination
between stakeholders to ensure that they are prepared for hostage situations; and (4)
encouraging greater compliance with anti-piracy defensive measures). See also
Announcement that Piracy Ransoms Task Force publishes recommendations, GOV.UK (Dec.
11, 2012), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/piracy-ransoms-task-force-publishes-
recommendations.
131. See INTERNATIONAL PIRACY RANSOMS TASK FORCE, supra note 113. R
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Force’s conclusion that the world community should work together to bet-
ter protect ships against being hijacked, and to better ensure an effective
and appropriate response should a hijacking occur.132  Nevertheless, some
commentators have suggested that an outright ban on ransom payments
could put an end to piracy as a global threat.133  We expect those calls will
likely continue, especially if pirates continue with any regularity to hijack
ships and hold their crews hostage in exchange for ransom payments.  We
hope our analysis will advance the conversation about whether a piracy
ransom ban does, in fact, offer a promising tool for solving the problem of
maritime piracy.
III. Analyzing the Legality of a Piracy Ransom Ban
In this section of the Article, we analyze whether criminalizing ransom
payments would be consistent with the retributive principles of the crimi-
nal law.  Retribution is a moral justification for the imposition of criminal
punishment.  According to retributive principles, the state is justified in
imposing criminal sanctions on those who deserve it: those who are
guilty.134  We ask whether punishing ship owners and other individuals
who pay a ransom, in exchange for the safe release of innocent victims, is
consistent with the criminal law’s retributive aims.  Should the criminal
law punish those who pay piracy ransoms under these circumstances, or
should these individuals be spared the imposition of sanctions?
We explore these questions by comparing the potential crime of pay-
ing piracy ransoms to other similar conduct where one makes a payment to
a person or organization engaged in criminal activities.  Based on this defi-
nition of “other similar conduct,” we examine how the criminal law in the
United States135 treats those who engage in the following types of conduct:
(1) paying ransoms to kidnappers; (2) making payments in response to
extortionate threats; and (3) paying bribes.  Because it also involves pun-
ishing individuals for making payments, possibly even when under duress,
we also consider the United States’ law that criminalizes financing
terrorism.
132. Id. at 2.
133. Lansing & Petersen, supra note 84, at 513 (“The shipping industry must collec- R
tively mandate a no-ransom policy for all firms.”).
134. See MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 91
(1997) (“Retributivism is a very straightforward theory of punishment: We are justified
in punishing because and only because offenders deserve it.”); John Bronsteen, Retribu-
tion’s Role, 84 IND. L.J. 1129, 1129 (2009) (noting that retributivists justify punishment
based on the wrongdoing of the offender).
135. One reason we refer to United States law to examine this question of criminaliz-
ing ransom payments is because it is the law with which we are most familiar.  We
nevertheless expect the analysis would be similar if one referenced the laws of other
countries following the common law or civil law traditions, because they, too, will typi-
cally require “criminal intent” in order to punish individuals for violating the criminal
law. See, e.g., Greg Taylor, Concepts of Intention in German Criminal Law, 24 OXFORD J.L.
STUD. 99, 99 (2004) (describing how intent is required in order for someone to be con-
victed of attempted murder in Germany).
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A. Kidnapping, Extortion, and Bribery
Where kidnap for ransom, extortion, and bribery are concerned, it is
evident that each involves a payment to another— just as does paying a ran-
som to pirates in exchange for a release of hostages.  For simplicity and
consistency purposes, we use the federal criminal law of the United States
to illustrate.136  For example, 18 U.S.C. § 1201 makes it a federal crime to
kidnap and hold any person for ransom or reward, or to attempt or con-
spire to kidnap another for ransom or reward.137  Extortion is also a fed-
eral crime.138  Specifically, the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, makes it a
crime to obstruct, delay, or affect commerce by extortion, or to attempt or
conspire to do the same.139  The statute defines “extortion” as “the
obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful
use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official
right.”140  18 U.S.C. § 201 criminalizes “corruptly” giving or offering
something of value to a public official “with intent” to “influence any offi-
cial act,” or “with intent” to influence an official to commit or allow a fraud
against the United States.141  The same statute subjects any public official
to punishment who “corruptly” demands, seeks, or receives anything of
value in return for being influenced to commit any official act, who does or
fails to do any act in violation of official duties, or who commits any fraud
against the United States.142  Although we focus on federal criminal law,
states also criminalize the same or similar conduct.143
Of the three different crimes, however, only bribery subjects the per-
son who makes a payment to punishment.144  In the kidnapping and extor-
tion context, the person or entity receiving a payment— not the person
136. Limiting our review to federal criminal law, rather than the laws of 50 different
states, makes sense in this context, where the purpose is to help facilitate a general
analysis of whether piracy ransom payments should be criminalized.  The focus on fed-
eral criminal law also makes sense because maritime piracy is a federal offense under 18
U.S.C. § 1651 (2012).  Because piracy is a federal offense, any criminalization of piracy
ransom payments also would likely occur at the federal level.
137. The federal kidnapping statute requires a federal nexus to apply.  18 U.S.C.
§ 1201 (2012).  For example, the kidnapper must travel over state lines, use the mails or
any instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce to further commission of the
offense, or kidnap a foreign official. Id.
138. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012).
139. Id.
140. Id.  For this analysis, we do not focus on the part of the Hobbs Act that deals
with extortion “under color of official right.”
141. 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2012).
142. Id.
143. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 207, 209 (West 2013) (defining the crime of kid-
napping to include forcibly taking, holding, or detaining another person, and also
criminalizing kidnapping for ransom or reward); CAL. PENAL CODE § 520 (West 2013)
(making it a crime to “extort[ ] any money or other property from another . . . by means
of force, or any threat”); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 7 (West 2013) (defining “bribe” as “any-
thing of value . . . or any promise or undertaking to give any, asked, given, or accepted,
with a corrupt intent to influence, unlawfully, the person to whom it is given, in his or
her action, vote, or opinion”); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 67– 68 (West 2013) (criminalizing the
conduct of persons who offer or accept bribes).
144. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1201, and 18 U.S.C. § 1951, with 18 U.S.C. § 201.
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making the payment— is the one whose behavior is considered criminal.145
Why is there such a distinction in treatment?  Here, we focus on the mental
state component of criminal liability.  The relevant criminal law statutes’
retributive principles subject to criminal sanctions those who demand a
ransom, or who make a threat to obtain money or other property, because
those individuals have intentionally engaged in wrongful acts.  Those who
only pay, however, are treated as victims because they do not intend to
engage in wrongful acts, even though by the fact of their payments they are
in some sense furthering criminal activity.  The criminal law does not sub-
ject the payer to punishment because the payer does not have a sufficiently
culpable mental state: because he acted under duress, he does not deserve
to be punished.  In fact, by its very definition, extortion occurs when one is
required to pay money under duress or coercion.146
As Professor Joshua Dressler explains, duress implicates threats rather
than offers.147  An individual acts under duress if he does something in
response to a threat by another to make himself worse off than he would
have been otherwise.148  In other words, he acts only because of fear or
coercion.149  By contrast, one does not act under duress if he responds to
an offer to improve his position.150  In such cases, we conclude that the
individual’s acts are more voluntary since they are prompted by desire, as
opposed to fear.151  “Intuitively, society believes that conduct is freer when
individuals respond to temptations than when they act out of fear.”152
When individuals act out of fear in response to a threat to make them
worse off than they otherwise would have been, they can claim the legal
defense of duress, and their acts will be imputed to the one who made the
threat.153
The legal defense of duress does not apply to any and all threats, how-
ever.154  For the defense to be available, the threat must come from a per-
son and be an unlawful threat to imminently cause death or great bodily
harm to a human being.155  The one receiving the threat must not also
have been at fault for putting himself in the situation to be coerced.156For
example, one who joins a criminal organization, and thereafter commits an
145. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1201, 1951.
146. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951; United States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49, 77 (3d Cir. 1971)
(“[T]he essence of extortion is duress”). See also Steven J. Mulroy, “Official” Explanation:
Defining “Official Capacity” and Related “Color of Office” Phrases in Bribery and Extortion
Law, 38 U. MEM. L. REV. 587, 598– 99 (2008) (noting that extortion payments are often
coerced).
147. Joshua Dressler, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching
for its Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1336 (1989).
148. See id.
149. See id. at 1336– 37
150. Id. at 1337.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See id. at 1337, 1339.
154. See id. at 1339.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1341.
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unlawful act in response to a threat from a member of the criminal organi-
zation, will not be able to claim the defense of duress.157
The criminal law treats as victims those who pay kidnappers and
those who give in to extortionate demands.158  In both cases, the individ-
ual pays money because of a threat to cause wrongful harm to others or to
themselves.  In neither case is the individual responding to an offer or
enticement or in any sense acting to improve his position from what it oth-
erwise would have been.  In the case of kidnapping, the payer accedes to
the ransom demand so as to save the life of an innocent victim.  The payer
accedes to extortionate demands for the same reason: in response to a
threat to make the payer or others worse off than they otherwise would
have been.  In short, in both cases, the payers are victims.  In both cases,
payers act similarly to those who “give up” a purse or a wallet to a robber in
order to avoid being harmed— the criminal law treats these persons as vic-
tims, not perpetrators, despite the fact that handing one’s purse over to a
robber in some way facilitates the robbery.159
One who pays a bribe, by contrast, can be criminally liable for making
a payment, but only because he acts with the required “corrupt intent”— the
intent to receive a quid pro quo or specific benefit in return for the pay-
ment to one in a position of trust.160  With a bribe, one pays knowingly
and willingly to receive the illicit benefit of better than fair treatment.161  In
other words, he pays voluntarily in an effort to improve his own situation
from what it otherwise would be absent the payment.162  Of course, even
one who pays in the bribery context could claim that his payment was not
truly willingly made: he paid only because he knew there was no other way
to get the official, for example, to provide a contract or a license to do
business.  In this case, the law would not excuse the payer’s conduct
because the payer is still just seeking a benefit to improve his situation.163
On the other hand, what may appear to be bribery becomes acceding to an
extortionate demand under circumstances where the payment is in
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1341.  The duress defense is applicable to our analysis, while the defense
of necessity is not.  Necessity is a defense that is typically available only in response to
natural forces: for example, it is available when one commits a crime that would consti-
tute the lesser of two evils in response to a naturally-caused condition, such as a hurri-
cane. Id. at 1347.  Our concern in this article is threats from people, not threats from
naturally-caused conditions.
159. See, e.g., Unintended Consequences: Refugee Victims of the War on Terror,
GEORGETOWN UNIV. LAW CTR., HUMAN RIGHTS INST.,23 n.157 (Mark Fleming et al. eds.,
2006) [hereinafter Georgetown Unintended Consequences] (“In the criminal context, an
individual forced to give money or goods to an armed group would be considered a
victim of criminal extortion, not a participant in the crime under U.S. criminal law.”).
160. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (requiring a showing of “corrupt intent”); United States v.
Muldoon, 931 F.2d 282, 287 (4th Cir. 1991) (defining corrupt intent as used in 18
U.S.C. § 201(b)).
161. See James Lindgren, The Theory, History, and Practice of the Bribery-Extortion
Distinction, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1695, 1698– 99 (1993).
162. See, e.g., United States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49, 77 (3d Cir. 1971).
163. See, e.g., Lindgren, supra note 161, at 1699.
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response to a threat of violence.164  For example, if the individual makes a
payment because he understands that his building will be destroyed
should he fail to pay an official, he will be acting only out of fear, and will
not be acting so as to gain better than fair treatment.165  In such a case, the
culpable mental state of “corrupt intent” in making the payment is
absent.166
Based on this analysis of current and comparable United States law,
one who pays a piracy ransom should not be criminally liable because he
acts under duress.  Like in the kidnapping and extortion contexts, one who
pays a piracy ransom does so out of fear or coercion.  The person pays
because the pirates threaten to harm hostages unless their demands are
met.  This is not a case of a person paying a bribe because of temptation or
desire to improve his situation.  Rather, it is the pirates who act out of
temptation or desire to obtain illegal profits from holding innocent victims
hostage.  The person who pays the ransom took no part in the hijacking,
and, instead, only learns about it after it has happened.  While the payment
may necessarily assist the pirates and help them continue their illegal activ-
ities, the payer is not making the payment with a criminal intent to assist in
those unlawful activities.  Nor is the payer receiving any portion of the ille-
gal profits from the activities.  Thus, as in the kidnapping and extortion
contexts, one would expect that the criminal law would only seek retribu-
tion against the pirates seeking the ransom, as opposed to against the per-
son who acceded to the pirates’ demand unwillingly.
B. Financing Terrorism
We further analyze the question of whether a piracy ransom ban
would be consistent with the criminal law’s retributive aims by examining
18 U.S.C. § 2339B, the provision of United States law that criminalizes pro-
viding “material support” for terrorism.167  We do so because like the laws
examined above, Section 2339B also covers the situation where one makes
a payment to another who is engaged in criminal activity.168  However,
unlike with bribery— the one context previously discussed where the law
would impose criminal liability on the payer169— one violates Section
2339B when he makes a payment, even without any corrupt or criminal
intent.170  In this section, we ask whether punishing those who pay piracy
164. See id. at 1695.
165. Id. at 1699.
166. See, e.g., Elizabeth K. Spahn, Local Law Provisions Under the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention, 39 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 249, 274 (2012) (stating that payers who pay
only in response to a threat to blow up an oil rig are acceding to extortionate demands,
and are not liable for bribery, because criminal intent is absent).
167. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006) is a provision of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104– 132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified in rele-
vant part at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331– 2339D (2006)).
168. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 144– 145. R
170. See U.S.C. § 2339B. .
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\47-2\CIN202.txt unknown Seq: 22  9-OCT-14 13:09
320 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 47
ransoms could be justified on the same or similar grounds that have been
used to justify punishing those who provide material support for terrorism.
18 U.S.C. § 2339B criminalizes knowingly providing “material sup-
port” to a foreign terrorist organization (“FTO”), or attempting or conspir-
ing to do the same.171  The statute defines “material support” to include
providing currency, monetary instruments, or financial securities.”172
FTOs should be understood as foreign organizations that engage in terror-
ist activities that threaten the security of the United States.173  An up-to-
date list of those who have been designated as FTOs is available on the U.S.
State Department’s website.174
The language of Section 2339B clearly criminalizes the act of making a
payment.175  But does it require the payment be made voluntarily or with
some intention to further criminal activity?  The answer to this question is
important because the analysis of how payers are treated in the context of
kidnapping, extortion, and bribery thus far suggests that the criminal law
ought only punish those who pay voluntarily with the actual intention of
aiding or participating in the criminal activity.176  If Section 2339B
criminalizes payments made under duress, then Section 2339B will run
counter to our preceding analysis.
Both the language of Section 2339B, and the Supreme Court case law
interpreting it, suggest that one need not intend to aid any criminal activity
in order to be criminally liable for financing terrorism.177  By Section
2339B’s plain language, one is guilty of financing terrorism as long as he
has knowledge that the organization to whom he is giving money has been
designated as a terrorist organization— whether or not he intends to further
any terrorist activities.178
Additionally, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Holder v. Human-
itarian Law Project supports a conclusion that only knowledge is required
for a conviction under Section 2339B.179  In Humanitarian Law Project,
plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of Section 2339B’s “material sup-
port” provision.180  The plaintiffs argued, among other things, that the pro-
vision violated their First Amendment rights of freedom of speech and
association by failing to require the government to prove a specific intent to
171. Id.
172. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1). See also 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(g)(4) (adopting the defini-
tion of “material support” found in Section 2339A).
173. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(g)(6) (referring to Section 219 of the Immigration Nation-
ality Act.  Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act is available at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1189.).
174. See Bureau of Counterterrorism, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, U.S. DEP’T ST.
(Sept. 28, 2012), http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm.
175. See U.S.C. § 2339B.
176. See discussion supra Part III.A.
177. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B; see also Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 17
(2010).
178. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B
179. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. .at 17.
180. Id. at 7.
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further the unlawful ends of the designated FTOs.181  Plaintiffs stated that
they only wanted to provide training and assistance to support the lawful
and nonviolent activities of two groups which were on the FTO list— groups
which had committed some terrorist attacks, but which also were working
towards establishing independent states for the Kurds in Turkey and for the
Tamils in Sri Lanka.182  The Supreme Court, however, concluded that the
statute was constitutional as applied “to the particular activities plaintiffs
[said] they wish[ed] to pursue.”183
Although it declined to “address the resolution of more difficult cases
that may arise under the statute,”184 the Humanitarian Law Project Court
did explain why Section 2339B did not violate the Constitution by requir-
ing only knowledge, rather than intent.185  First, the Court noted that by
the language of the statute, “Congress plainly spoke to the necessary
mental state for a violation of § 2339B, and it chose knowledge about the
organization’s connection to terrorism, not specific intent to further the
organization’s terrorist activities.”186  It further noted that a review of the
statute’s legislative history showed that both Congress and the Executive
Branch had determined that “providing material support to a designated
foreign terrorist organization— even seemingly benign support— bolsters
the terrorist activities of that organization.”187  The Court echoed that
determination when it stated:
Material support meant to promot[e] peaceable, lawful conduct . . . can fur-
ther terrorism by foreign groups in multiple ways.  Material support is a valu-
able resource by definition.  Such support frees up other resources within
the organization that may be put to violent ends.  It also importantly helps
lend legitimacy to foreign terrorist groups— legitimacy that makes it easier
for those groups to persist, to recruit members, and to raise funds— all of
which facilitate more terrorist attacks.188
However, the Supreme Court’s decision in Humanitarian Law Project
does not mean that Section 2339B would be constitutional if it was used to
punish those who give money to terrorist organizations involuntarily.  The
Court confined its conclusion, that Section 2339B’s “material support”
provision does not require any intent to further the unlawful activities of
the terrorist organization, to the facts before it.189  The facts in Humanita-
rian Law Project show that the individuals in that case intended to volunta-
rily give money to the organizations in question.190  They wanted to give
181. Id. at 7, 17.
182. Id. at 11– 12.
183. Id. at 8.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 16– 17.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 36.
188. Id. at 30 (internal quotation marks omitted).
189. Id. at 8 (“We conclude that the material-support statute is constitutional as
applied to the particular activities plaintiffs have told us they wish to pursue. We do not,
however, address the resolution of more difficult cases that may arise under the statute
in the future.”).
190. Id. at 10– 11.
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money to organizations that they knew engaged in terrorist activities; they
were not paying because of any threat or out of fear.191  Thus, the plaintiffs
in Humanitarian Law Project would not be able to claim that they acted
under duress such that they should be relieved of criminal liability.  How-
ever, though the plaintiffs in Humanitarian Law Project did not intend to
further the criminal activities of the terrorist organizations, they did make
payments to further their own aims and desires.  The Humanitarian Law
Project plaintiffs are thus unlike the person who pays a ransom to a kidnap-
per or who pays in response to an extortionate demand.  Those individuals
pay out of fear because of a threat to make them worse off than they other-
wise would have been.192  In both the kidnap and extortion situations, the
individuals who pay would have had no interaction with the payee and the
payees’ criminal activities had they not been forced to pay in order to avoid
having a threat carried out against them or against other innocent
parties.193
In the absence of a decision precisely on point, we cannot unequivo-
cally state that Section 2339B cannot constitutionally criminalize one who
provides money to a terrorist organization only in response to a ransom
demand.  Research has not revealed any cases where the government is
charging an individual with violating Section 2339B because he paid a ran-
som in order to save hostages from being harmed or killed at the hands of
terrorists.  Nevertheless, the analysis above does show that punishing those
who make payments under duress would not be consistent with the crimi-
nal law’s retributive principles.
IV. Analyzing the Practicality of a Piracy Ransom Ban
In this section of the Article, we analyze the practicality of a piracy
ransom ban by considering the unique international context in which mar-
itime piracy occurs.  Here, we examine whether, from an international law
or collective action standpoint, there are reasons to believe that a state’s
individual decision to criminalize ransom payments would not provide an
effective solution to the problem of maritime piracy.  We conclude that
absent a universal ban— which is probably unlikely— a piracy ransom ban
will not deter pirates from continuing to hijack ships and holding their
crews hostage.
Central to our analysis of the practicality of a piracy ransom ban is the
ban’s purported deterrence rationale.  As discussed above, states with “no
concessions” policies have resolved the ethical dilemma posed by a ransom
ban in favor of the long-term goal of deterring future illegal activity,
thereby protecting individuals from being held by pirates for ransom.194
Though these states accept that acceding to a ransom demand may save the
lives of those individuals who are presently being held hostage, these states
191. See id. at 10– 11.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 158– 159. R
193. See id.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 87– 88. R
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nevertheless favor a policy that they believe will protect more of their citi-
zens from harm.195  Those favoring a piracy ransom ban advance this same
deterrence rationale.196
However, we suggest that, when acting alone, a given state cannot
hope to deter future acts of maritime piracy, thereby protecting its citizens
from being future victims, by passing a law that forbids its citizens from
acceding to pirates’ ransom demands.  We conclude as much because of
the international context in which maritime piracy occurs.  In the piracy
context, one state’s ransom ban may not inure to the benefit of that state’s
citizens because pirates will not likely know in advance the citizenship of
the crewmembers of the ships they attack.  Ships flying the flag of one
state can include crewmembers from all over the world.197  The February
2011 capture of the Greek supertanker MV Irene 900 miles off the coast of
Somalia illustrates this point.198The twenty-five-member crew included
seventeen Filipinos, seven Greeks, and one Georgian.199  In short, even if
pirates may learn that certain countries have piracy ransom bans, such a
ban will still not keep that states’ citizens safe and off limits since pirates
cannot tell the nationalities of a ship’s crew simply by looking at the ship
itself.  Pirates may simply become more violent when they realize that they
have captured a ship with laws forbidding the ship owner from paying a
ransom.
Another practical issue arises from the fact that those who would be
prohibited from paying ransoms are the ship owners, who may not share
the same citizenship of the crewmembers who are held hostage.  Filipinos
comprise one-third of the world’s sailors.200  Other large suppliers of sea-
farers include India, China, the Ukraine, Croatia, Latvia, Greece, Japan,
Russia, and the United Kingdom.201  Of the hostages being held by pirates
in 2012, a large number came from India (15%), the Philippines (12%) and
China (7%).202  As to ship owners, as of December 2010, the top 20 con-
trolled merchant fleets in terms of gross tonnage were owned by parent
companies located in the following states: Japan, Greece, Germany, China,
the United States, the United Kingdom, Norway, the Republic of Korea,
195. See supra text accompanying notes 89– 95. R
196. See supra text accompanying notes 110– 113. R
197. See, e.g., Yvonne M. Dutton, Virtual Witness Confrontation in Criminal Cases: A
Proposal to Use Videoconferencing Technology in Maritime Piracy Trials, 45 VAND. J. TRANS-
NAT’L L. 1283, 1319– 20 (2012).
198. Id. at 1319.
199. Id.  The ship, cargo, and crew were released two months later after the pirates
were paid a $13.5 million ransom. Id.
200. Filipino seafarers remain a top choice of Japanese ship owners, GMA NEWS ONLINE
(Oct. 28, 2008), http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/129907/pinoyabroad/fili
pino-seafarers-remain-a-top-choice-of-japanese-ship-owners.
201. Numbers and Nationalities of World’s Seafarers, GLOBAL PACIFIC, http://www.wel
kin.ws/merchant-navy/shipping-industry/numbers-and-nationality-of-worlds-seafarers/
(last visited Feb. 18, 2014).
202. KAIJA HURLBURT ET. AL., THE HUMAN COST OF MARITIME PIRACY 2012, at 4 (2013),
available at http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/attachments/View%20
Full%20Report.pdf
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Denmark, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Italy, Russia, Canada, Turkey,
Malaysia, India, France, and Belgium.203  A situation could arise where a
ship’s owner and a ship’s crew are from various countries, some of which
have banned ransom payments, and some of which have not.  In such a
situation, the citizens of multiple countries could suffer as a result of one
country’s ban on ransom payments.
The fact that a handful of states supply most of the world’s seafarers is
one reason why getting states to agree on a universal ban against paying
piracy ransoms is unlikely. There is a collective action problem where
refusing to negotiate may be in the interests of the world community as a
whole, but paying a ransom may be in the interest of some states or some
individuals.  Why would these states from which most crewmembers hail
agree to ban piracy ransoms when their citizens would so disproportion-
ately suffer from the imposition of such a ban?  Would these states will-
ingly sacrifice their own citizens’ lives in the short term, even if the long
term result would be that pirates would be deterred more generally from
engaging in future hijackings?  Could these states ethically justify requir-
ing their citizens to choose to sacrifice the safety of a person being held for
ransom, so as to deter future pirate attacks?  We suggest that unless all
states agree to a piracy ransom ban, including the states from which most
crewmembers hail, there is little hope that pirates will be deterred from
continuing to hijack ships in the hopes of receiving huge ransoms for the
release of ships’ crews.  States cannot send a message to pirates that
hijacking ships will not pay unless all states and ship owners are equally
constrained from meeting pirates’ demands.
One way to mitigate this problem of risking the lives of one state’s
citizens as the result of another state’s piracy ransom ban would be for the
state with the ban to agree to use military force to rescue the hostages.  Yet
this solution comes with its own set of potentially insurmountable interna-
tional law and collective action issues.  Different states may have seemingly
greater or lesser interests in deploying their military forces to free hostages.
States may also have greater or lesser abilities in this regard.  Some states
may want their citizens to be rescued, but they may not have the military
might to accomplish such a rescue safely.  On the other hand, all rescue
efforts can be risky, even for the hostages who are to be rescued.  Some
states may not want their citizens exposed to those risks, even if the state
imposing the piracy ransom ban is willing to attempt a rescue.  Further-
more, a military rescue could be problematic and could be opposed by
some states where a ship’s cargo (oil, chemicals, etc.) could damage the
environment if the ship is damaged during a rescue attempt.This begs the
question: should seafarers on ships with certain kinds of cargo be entitled
to less protection than others?
203. Int’l Mar. Org., International Shipping Facts and Figures –  Information Resources
on Trade, Safety, Security, Environment § 3.7, MAR. KNOWLEDGE CTR. (2012), available at
http://www.imo.org/KnowledgeCentre/ShipsAndShippingFactsAndFigures/TheRole
andImportanceofInternationalShipping/Documents/International%20Shipping%20-%
20Facts%20and%20Figures.pdf.
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Even if states supplying the world’s crewmembers did not object to
individual state ransom bans, or were willing to implement such bans,
obtaining a universal piracy ransom ban is still unlikely.  Because ship
owners do not favor a ban,204 both flag states and home states of ship
owners have financial and other incentives to refuse to ban piracy ransoms.
The bottom line is that ship owners will want to pay for the release of their
cargo and crews, even if it means that by doing so they are necessarily
fueling maritime piracy.  Many ship owners might feel moral or religious
obligations to save their crews from harm.205 They may also come under
public pressure to pay so that innocent lives are spared.206  In addition, the
cost of purchasing kidnap and ransom insurance, and the cost of a multi-
million dollar ransom payment,207 pale in comparison to the monies ship
owners lose when their ships are detained for months or even years by
pirates: a typical hijacking of a cargo ship in 2011 cost the ship owner
around $9 million in unrealized charter rates alone.208
To explain why flag states and home states will want to embrace the
views of ship owners and refuse to ban piracy ransoms, we focus on open
registries, known as a “flags of convenience,” and also on the nature of the
global economy.  Our conclusion is that there is a clear incentive structure
militating strongly against the universal, nearly simultaneous piracy ran-
som ban that would be required to achieve the stated goal of deterrence.
While banning piracy ransoms may be good for the world community as a
whole because it has the promise of stopping pirates from hijacking ships,
a collective action problem arises whereby some states or individuals will
view paying ransoms to be more individually beneficial in the short run.
First, because of the open registry market, ship owners may choose to
locate and register their ships in a state that does not ban them from pay-
204. See supra text accompanying notes 114– 119. R
205. Lansing & Petersen, supra note 84, at 512– 13 (noting that ship owners may pay R
ransoms for religious reasons, but also may pay so as not to “ ‘have blood on their
hands’” or feel responsible for the death of another).
206. In both the MV Iceberg and MV Leopard cases, slanted coverage of the fate of the
two ships and the lack of effort taken to rescue their respective crews continued even
two years after the ships were initially captured. See, e.g., Priyanka Dube and Shoaib
Ahmed, MV Iceberg: 2 years on, Govt yet to take action, CBB-IBN (Mar. 30, 2012), http://
ibnlive.in.com/news/mv-iceberg-2-years-on-govt-yet-to-take-action/243978-3.html
(“Abandoned by the ship owner, tortured by the pirates and forgotten by the Indian
government, the sailors [aboard the MV Iceberg] are the longest-held hostages in
Somalia”; see also Fate of the crew of m/v Leopard is unclear with owner’s insolvency, MAR.
BULLETIN (Oct. 14, 2011), http://www.odin.tc/news/print.asp?articleID=58. But see
KAIJA HURLBURT ET. AL., THE HUMAN COST OF SOMALI PIRACY 28 (2011), available at http://
oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/human_cost_of_somali_piracy.pdf  (estab-
lishing that the human cost of piracy is still underreported and misunderstood by the
public).
207. ECOP 2012 supra note 16, at 10, 33 (listing typical insurance kidnap and ran- R
som insurance rates as ranging from $7,500 to $12,500, and listing $3.97 million as an
average ransom payment).
208. See James Kraska, Freakonomics of Maritime Piracy, 16 BROWN J. WORLD AFF.,
Spring/Summer 2010, at 114 (“A typical [cargo] vessel charter rate is $50,000 per
day . . . .”); ECOP 2011, supra note 37, at 11 (reporting that the average duration of a R
pirate hostage taking in 2011 was 6 months).
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ing piracy ransoms.  Registering a vessel in an open registry state is not an
onerous process, sometimes requiring little more than the ship owner com-
pleting a registration form in order to fly the flag of another state.209
Forum shopping through ship registries can be traced back to English
merchants sailing under the Spanish flag in the sixteenth century to evade
English trade regulations.210 Similarly, the contemporary, widespread use
of flags of convenience is seen primarily as a tool for ship owners to forum
shop for favorable taxation and regulatory provisions.211  In turn, open
registry states treat their ship registries as profit-making entities, and the
fear of losing income to states with more ship owner-friendly regulatory
regimes creates a clear incentive for states to cater to the needs and desires
of ship owners, which at present requires, among other things, allowing
ransom payments to pirates.212
Moreover, these registries are often significantly economically impor-
tant to the countries operating them.  Take, for example, LISCR, LLC, a
Virginia-based limited liability corporation that acts as Liberia’s national
registry.213  According to the United States Department of State, Liberia’s
“revenues come primarily from rubber exports and revenues from its mari-
time registry program.”214  In 2004, the last year the LISCR was audited, its
gross revenues were $36 million,215 which, as of 2011, would compose
almost 3% of Liberia’s entire GDP.216  In 2007, LISCR’s revenue accounted
for a full 6% of the government of Liberia’s total operating budget.217
Given that ship registration generates an important, if not essential, reve-
nue stream for some states by catering to the interests of ship owners,
209. What are Flags of Convenience?, INT’L TRANSP. WORKERS’ FED’N, http://www.itf-
global.org/flags-convenience/sub-page.cfm (last visited Feb. 18, 2014) (“Cheap registra-
tion fees, low or no taxes and freedom to employ cheap labour are the motivating factors
behind a shipowner’s decision to ‘flag out.’”); Jessica K. Ferrell, Comment, Controlling
Flags of Convenience: One Measure to Stop Overfishing of Collapsing Fish Stocks, 35 Envtl.
L. 323, 336 (2005) (“Generally, a vessel’s flag is considered [a flag of convenience] if the
only link between the flag state and the ship is registration— as opposed to management,
crew, nationality, ownership, or any other “genuine” connection with the state.”).
210. BOLESLAW ADAM BOCZEK, FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE 6 (1962).
211. R. Tali Epstein, Note, Should the Fair Labor Standards Act Enjoy Extraterritorial
Application?: A Look at the Unique Case of Flags of Convenience, 13 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L.
653, 666 (1993).
212. Paul T. Hinckley, Raising The Spector of Discrimination: The Case for Disregarding
“Flags of Convenience” in the Application of U.S. Anti-Discrimination Laws to Cruise Ships,
3 MOD. AM., Summer-Fall 2007, at 76 (describing the “race to the bottom” created by
countries’ open ship registry systems).
213. Company Overview of LISCR, LLC, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, http://invest-
ing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapid= 6530292 (last
visited Oct. 29, 2013); see also LIBERIAN CORPORATE REGISTRY, http://liberiancorporations
.com/ (follow “CONTACT US” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 18, 2014).
214. Bureau of African Affairs, U.S. Relations with Liberia, U.S. DEP’T ST. (July 26,
2013), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6618.htm.
215. Adam Shaw, Liberia: A New, Assertive Bureau of Maritime Affairs, WIKILEAKS, ¶ 8
(Jan. 21, 2009), http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/01/09MONROVIA70.html.
216. See Liberia Country Report, GLOBAL FIN., http://www.gfmag.com/gdp-data-coun
try-reports/233-liberia-gdp-country-report.html#axzz2j3WNn7fb (last visited Oct. 29,
2013).
217. Shaw, supra note 215, ¶ 8. R
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states dependent on such revenue streams have a substantial interest in not
instituting a ransom ban.
The nature of the globalized economy provides a second reason why
states are unlikely to ban ransoms.  There is such a diversity of corporate
advantages and disadvantages, depending on which state a business oper-
ates in, that any business owner, ship owner or otherwise, can move his
business to the state where he will be afforded the most advantage.  To
illustrate the ease with which modern multi-national corporations can use
regulatory diversity to their advantage, consider the example of multi-
nationals transferring their profits out of the United States to low-tax juris-
dictions such as Ireland.  Economist Martin Sullivan explained the process
as follows in testimony to the United States House Ways and Means
Committee:
Suppose a U.S. multinational has a foreign manufacturing and distribution
subsidiary in Ireland. Suppose that for a nominal fee the U.S. parent com-
pany allows the Irish subsidiary to use valuable marketing and manufactur-
ing intangibles. Without access to these intangible [sic] the Irish subsidiary
would only have $100 of profits. $100 is the true economic income attribu-
table to the activities in Ireland. Access to the parent company’s intangibles
allows the Irish subsidiary to book $300 of profit. The Irish subsidiary
should be paying the U.S. parent $200 in royalties (or its equivalent) but
because of lax transfer pricing rules it does not.
The corporate tax rate in Ireland is 12.5 percent, so Irish tax liability in this
example is $37.50. The shift of $200 of profits out of the United States
reduces U.S. taxes by $70. The total net tax on the Irish investment is minus
$32.50 on $100 of economic income. The effective tax rate is negative 32.5
percent. This is far below the 35-percent rate paid by purely domestic U.S.
corporations on their profits and far below what Irish corporations pay on
income from their domestic operations.218
In other words, because the United States treats subsidiary companies
as unrelated to the parent, and because of the difficulty of placing an accu-
rate valuation on intangible assets such as patents, multi-national enter-
prises are able to achieve low, sometimes negative effective tax rates.  This
is particularly the case in industries that rely heavily on intangible assets,
such as the pharmaceutical industry, where the seven largest companies
saw an increase of 361% in foreign profits between 1997 and 2007, with a
corresponding 80% decrease in domestic profits.219  These changes in
profit allocation did not correspond to changes in actual business prac-
tices.220  They are almost entirely attributable to multi-nationals’ legally
compliant tax planning, which takes advantage of regulatory diversity to
218. Testimony of Martin A. Sullivan on Transfer Pricing Issues in the Global Economy:
Hearing before the Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, 112th
Cong. 6 (July 22, 2010), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/111/
2010jul22_sullivan_testimony.pdf.
219. See id. at 3.
220. See Martin A. Sullivan, Drug Company Profits Shift Out of United States, TAX
NOTES, 1163– 66 (Mar. 8, 2010), http://www.bradreese.com/blog/3-8-2010.pdf.
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help the bottom line.221
It is easy to imagine a similar “regulatory arbitrage” occurring in the
shipping industry in the case of a piracy ransom ban.  Imagine the United
States passes a law banning any American ship owner from paying a ran-
som to pirates.  In this hypothetical, the nearby Bahamas has no such ran-
som ban.  The American ship owner can avoid the United States ban by
creating a Bahamian subsidiary, wholly owned by the American parent
company, in order to pay the ransom.  This easily executed tactic to avoid
one state’s ransom ban suggests that any single ransom ban may have little
hope of achieving the desired deterrent effect.  Additionally, one state’s
decision to implement a ransom ban could cause it to lose revenues from
businesses that relocate to other states.  It is the equivalent of economic
unilateral disarmament.  To be sure, some countries would place their
sense of moral and ethical obligation to deter piracy above the economic
disincentive.  But the fact remains that as long as it is possible to imagine
one country that chooses to place economics above morals, it remains
impossible to imagine a piracy ransom ban that functions as desired.
Finally, even if ship owners decide to remain in states that criminalize
piracy ransoms, policing ship owners to ensure they do not pay a piracy
ransom could prove very difficult.  Trying to police against ship owners
purchasing kidnap and ransom insurance could also prove difficult.  The
collective action problem is again at play.  Ship owners will not likely take
kindly to any ransom ban unless it applies to all ship owners, since they
will otherwise believe they suffer an unfair disadvantage as compared to
ship owners who are not legally prohibited from paying ransoms.  As a
result, all states would need to be committed to enforcement and to devot-
ing resources to monitoring ship owner activities.  However, not all states
have the same financial resources or law enforcement capabilities.  Accord-
ingly, to ensure that any piracy ransom ban is effective, all states would
have to be committed to legislating it and committed to enforcing it.  States
would also likely have to be willing to monitor one another in order for a
ban to have any hope of producing its desired deterrent effect.
Conclusion
In sum, the legal and practical issues surrounding any potential ban
on piracy ransom payments are substantial.  Legally, a ban is likely incon-
sistent with the retributive principles of the criminal law, because such a
ban would punish those who pay money to pirates under duress without
any actual intent to further criminal activity.  Further, from an interna-
tional law standpoint, banning piracy ransoms would be impractical
because any such ban would pose collective action problems.  Our analysis
suggests that states should not even continue to consider a piracy ransom
ban unless they are prepared to act in a coordinated fashion.  States have
little or no hope of deterring maritime piracy unless all states are prepared
221. Id. at 1166.
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to criminalize the payment of ransoms to pirates.  One state’s ban is not
only unlikely to have a general deterrent effect, but it is also unlikely to
protect its own citizens from being taken hostage.  Without total coopera-
tion, a piracy ransom ban could put innocent lives at risk without provid-
ing deterrence.
Absent a universal ban, governments, of course, can proceed with the
status quo and permit individuals to pay ransoms to pirates without any
risk of being criminally sanctioned.  Governments can also explore other
ways to facilitate deterring acts of maritime piracy.  For example, govern-
ments could become more involved in ransom negotiations.  This is not to
say that governments should pay ransoms directly.  But if national law
enforcement agencies were more deeply involved in the negotiation pro-
cess, they may be able to more effectively gather information that could be
used to prosecute the financiers and enablers of piracy, an oft-stated goal
of the international community.222  If those “larger fish” are captured and
prosecuted, the result may be that some pirate gangs are deprived of their
leaders or the funds they need to stage attacks, thereby deterring some acts
of piracy.
No path forward may offer a perfect solution, which we define as one
that puts an end to maritime piracy and makes the high seas safe for those
who transit through them.  We are sympathetic to the need to find a solu-
tion to the problem of maritime piracy and the piracy ransoms that help
fuel the illegal activity which threatens the lives of innocent seafarers.
However, we urge states to fully consider all of the legal and practical
issues associated with a piracy ransom ban before advancing a ban as the
solution to what is a very complicated problem.  We also urge states to
work together to seek coordinated and universal solutions.  Our hope is
that by analyzing and addressing those issues here, we have helped
encourage deep, meaningful and inclusive policy discussions.
222. See, e.g., 2013 World Bank Report, supra note 14, at 179. R
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